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Practical wisdom is a key concept in the field of virtue ethics and it has played a significant 
role in the thinking of those who make use of virtue when theorising medical practice and 
ethics. In this article, we examine how storytelling and practical wisdom play integral roles in 
the medical ethics education of junior doctors. Using a qualitative approach, we conducted 46 
interviews with a cohort of junior doctors, to explore the role doctors feel phronesis has in 
their medical ethics practice, and how they acquire practical wisdom through storytelling as 
an essential part of their medical ethics education. Through thematic analysis of the 
interviews, we discuss the key role storytelling about moral exemplars and role models plays 
in developing medical ethics education, and how telling stories about role models is 
considered to be one of the most useful ways to learn medical ethics. We finish by 
developing an argument for why practical wisdom should be an important part of medical 
ethics training, focusing on the important role that phronesis narratives should have in 

















Phronesis – or practical wisdom - is a key concept in the field of virtue ethics (Russell, 2009) 
and it has played a significant role in the thinking of those who make use of virtue when 
theorising medical practice and ethics. In recent years, a large body of literature has not only 
recognised the importance of moral virtues like care, honesty and courage to medical 
practice, but has argued that the ethical doctor embodies a practical moral know how, 
something that is necessary if good moral motivations (dispositions or virtues) are to produce 
or result in good clinical practices. This practical moral know how is often referred to or 
represented as ‘professionalism’, ‘professional judgement’, or ‘clinical judgement’. Drawing 
on Aristotle, a number of virtue ethicists concerned with medicine and healthcare (e.g. 
Pellegrino and Thomasma, 1993; Kaldjian, 2010, 2014) have called this know how 
‘phronesis’. While the importance of the virtue of phronesis is a well-established feature of 
the literature in medical ethics (Blinded for Peer Review), little is known about the extent to 
which phronesis is in fact present in medical practice, and even less work has been done to 
understand how doctors acquire the virtue of phronesis.   
In this article, we examine the role doctors feel phronesis has in their medical ethics practice. 
Drawing on Zagzebski’s recent ‘exemplarist’ account of the acquisition of phronesis, we 
focus on the role storytelling plays in developing phronesis (2013). Using a hybrid 
methodology that draws on the social sciences and the humanities, we outline how the 
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philosophical concept of phronesis can be examined empirically and sociologically. We 
highlight how phronesis is considered an important part of best practice, and how storytelling 
played an integral role in the development of phronesis during the medical training of a 
cohort of junior doctors. We argue that not only is storytelling one of the primary ways that 
phronesis is developed, but it is also the primary way that the development of phronesis can 
be examined empirically.  
What is Phronesis and why is it important to ethical decision-making? 
In the Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle sets out an account of morality in terms of the moral 
virtues, focusing on the traits of a person’s moral character. The moral virtues are not innate 
features of a person’s personality, but are acquired dispositions or habits (NE 1105b25–6). 
These are learned over time from moral role-models (often one’s teachers or parents) and are 
reinforced through experience and moral practice. Thus, the ‘honest’ person is one who has 
become habituated to acting honestly, the ‘kind’ person is one who has acquired the habit of 
acting kindly, etc. However, an account of morality sketched merely in terms of labelling 
moral virtues, is incomplete, for two prominent reasons. First, being habitually ‘kind’ does 
not always make clear what a person should do in a particular situation, such as those where 
kindness may result in a negative outcome. For instance: a doctor may find themselves pulled 
in two directions by their kindness - is it more kind to prolong a terminally ill patient’s life, or 
is it more kind to relieve pain at the cost of a few days’ life? Second, different virtues often 
conflict with one another. The doctor who is both kind and honest, for instance, may find that 
being honest in a particular situation comes at the cost of kindness (or vice versa) - take the 
decision whether to tell a patient the unvarnished truth about a tough prognosis, or sparing 
their feelings by sugar-coating the truth.  For this reason, Aristotelian accounts of virtue 
ethics stress that, in order to implement virtuous action, the good doctor must not only have 
these moral virtues, but needs a further virtue – the intellectual virtue of phronesis – to know 
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how to act virtuously in any given situation (Russell, 2009, Kristjansson, 2007, 2015; 
Pearson, 2007; Moss, 2011). 
A large literature has built around the role that phronesis plays in understanding how doctors 
make ethical decisions. Much of this literature presents phronesis as central to the skill of 
clinical judgement; as the ability of the good doctor to weigh up all the relevant factors that 
go into a diagnosis and treatment plan, and to come to a well-balanced decision [Blinded for 
peer review]. Virtue ethicists like Pellegrino and Thomasma (1994), Schulz and Carnevale 
(1996), Montgomery (2006), Kaldjian (2010 and 2014) and Toon (2014) also argue that the 
virtue of phronesis is crucial to good ethical decision-making in medicine. While virtues 
ensure that people act from the right intentions, taking the action itself requires practical 
moral know-how to determine how the right course of action can be implemented or pursued. 
This kind of practical wisdom is not easy to acquire. It develops over time and requires long 
practice and learning from example (Kassam et al., 2010). For many who study virtue ethics 
(e.g. Pellegrino and Thomasma, 1993; Hilton and Slotnick, 2005; Braude, 2011; Monrouxe et 
al., 2011; Ng et al., 2015) phronesis holds the key to understanding the nature of medical 
professionalism, how it is developed and how ethical decision-making is learned.  
 
Pellegrino and Thomasma (1993) provide what is, perhaps, the most forceful defence of 
phronesis in medical practice. They hold that rules- or principles-based approaches to 
medical ethics are ‘too abstract… [and]… too formularized and far removed from the 
concrete human particulars of moral choice’ (Pellegrino and Thomasma, 1993: 19). In their 
conception phronesis plays a crucial part: it is to them ‘medicine’s indispensable virtue’. 
(Pellegrino and Thomasma, 1993: 84) Phronesis provides a crucial link between a doctor’s 
medical knowledge/reasoning and their moral self, providing the key to resolving a long-
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standing issue in medicine – how to navigate the competing scientific and humanistic 
demands of ethical medical practice (Pellegrino and Thomasma, 1993).   
Recently, Kaldjian (2010, 2014) has argued that a proper understanding of doctors’ clinical 
thinking requires seeing good clinical judgement as a form of phronesis itself. Developing 
these themes, Kaldjian reasons that phronesis is needed for the doctor to integrate four 
different imperatives that may sometimes pull in different directions, these being: scientific 
knowledge; the patient’s preferences; their own moral view; and the priorities of society. Due 
to these complex factors, developing practical wisdom in doctors takes years of practice 
combined with learning by example from experienced clinicians.  
Despite the great deal of attention that phronesis has received in the literature on medical 
ethics, discussions of phronesis in medicine have tended towards the theoretical rather than 
on the empirical. Debate has centred on what the concept itself means (see Kristjánsson, 2015 
for an exploration of these debates). A previous survey of the literature on virtue approaches 
to medical ethics (including phronetic approaches) identified some early stage research on 
virtue in medicine generally [blinded for peer review]. However, a further survey of the 
literature conducted by ourselves identified only 17 qualitative empirical studies on phronesis 
or practical wisdom in medicine in the last decade. While the concept of phronesis has had 
more of an impact in nursing (12 published studies), few of the studies in our review focused 
on the development of phronesis in doctors (although, for a notable exception, see Little et al. 
2011). Furthermore, these do not consider in detail how phronesis can be developed, whether 
it can be taught or what exactly it can contribute to understanding ethical decision-making in 
current medicine. Instead study authors often assert the need for phronesis without providing 
empirical evidence that it exists, or how to learn and implement phronesis in practice.  
The Narrative Development of Phronesis 
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One thing that the studies reviewed had in common is that they all drew on a narrative 
approach, asking participants to recount narratives, in their own words, of wise judgements in 
practice. In theoretical accounts of phronesis narrative also plays an influential role in how 
phronesis is thought to be developed. Aristotle regularly stresses that “ethics” is not an exact 
science. Questions regarding what is right and wrong (morally) cannot be answered with the 
precision that we would associate with a science such as physics or chemistry, because ethics 
is context-specific. For Aristotle we can only understand actions and their actors as right or 
wrong by having a deep understanding of all the relevant facts about the situation; meaning 
the context in which they acted. (For Aristotle’s own explanation, see, for instance NE I, 7 
1098a, 27-35 and NE II, 2, 1104a, 1 – 5. For discussion see Irwin, 2000 and Hughes, 2013). 
Without knowledge of the specifics of the situation in which a person acted, as well as their 
motivations in acting, it is impossible to know if the actor acted with or without virtue and, 
therefore, rightly or wrongly.  
The most natural way to come to know the specifics of a situation that influenced a decision 
to act one way or another is to ask the actor to account for themselves which, in effect, 
requires them to tell a story or offer a narrative about the context and the decision they took. 
Simply put: the description of virtuous behaviour naturally involves the telling of something 
like a story. And when one needs to provide a description for another person regarding what 
is the virtuous thing to do – the kind of description that one needs to supply in teaching about 
virtue, for instance – narrative is a very natural vehicle to use. For this reason the teaching of 
virtue is often accomplished through the telling of stories.  
Narrative and storytelling are thought to be crucial to the development of phronesis, as they 
play an integral part in communicating stories about exemplars and their actions. Storytelling 
holds an important role in moral education as stories “engage our motives much more than 
abstract theories, and narratives are crucial to shaping our vision of a good life” (Zagzebski, 
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2013). In addition to informing, storytelling can be understood as a “model for human action 
and meaning” (Schultz and Flasher, 2011) – that is, stories can give some kind of template for 
what to do. The social sciences in particular have highlighted the important role that 
storytelling plays in moral education within a given community. Like the exemplars prized in 
virtue ethics, stories are not just sets of facts, “they are organising devices through which we 
interpret and constitute the world” (Lawler, 2008). Storytelling to teach morality is as much a 
part of the social world as it is virtue ethics. 
Let us look more closely at the mechanics of how narratives work to drive moral education in 
a virtue ethics framework. Narrative approaches to the acquisition of virtue argue that people 
understand and learn virtues primarily through first hand, narrative accounts of the actions of 
moral exemplars, that is, people who exemplify virtue (Zagzebski, 2013). As Zagzebski’s 
‘exemplarist’ account of the acquisition of virtue suggests:  
 ‘[w]e learn through narratives of fictional and non-fictional persons that some 
individuals are admirable and worth imitating.’ (2017: 15) 
For Zagzebski, we cannot describe what, exactly, makes a person a moral exemplar – moral 
exemplars do not all have certain features that we can pick out. Instead, moral exemplars are 
picked out through ostension (pointing out). As Zagzebski writes:  
‘basic moral terms are anchored in exemplars of moral goodness, direct reference to 
which are foundational in the theory. Good persons are persons like that, just as gold 
is stuff like that. Picking out exemplars fixes the reference of the term “good person” 
without the need for descriptive concepts.’ (2017: 15)   
Zagzebski holds that we do not understand what it is to be morally good first and then 
understand that a particular person is morally good. Rather, we can see that a person is 
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morally good and understand morality on the basis of being like that person. For instance, we 
do not first understand what honesty is and then see that Lincoln is honest; instead, honesty is 
being like honest Abe. 
Zabzebski also argues that we have a particular feeling for these exemplars: admiration. This 
feeling of admiration is shaped through the stories that people tell of real and fictional moral 
exemplars, so admiration is ‘educable’. (Zagzebski, 2017) Because we admire moral 
exemplars, we try to learn from them and, as a result, ‘emulate’ them. For Zagzebski this is 
what moral practice comes down to: imitating exemplars in how one acts.  
Studying Phronesis: creating a hybrid social science-humanities based methodology 
Starting from Zagzebski’s exemplarist understanding of the acquisition of virtue, we were 
interested to study the development of phronesis amongst junior doctors. Given the 
importance of narrative in both theoretical and empirical work on phronesis, it became clear 
that a hybrid methodological approach would be required if we were to capture the empirical 
data necessary to examine the importance of phronesis in learning to make ethical decisions 
in medicine, and the role that storytelling may play in the development of that phronesis. To 
reflect the humanities and social science frameworks within which our research is situated, a 
qualitative research design that focused on interviews was chosen for this project. This 
design reflects both the importance of qualitative research to empirical ethics and the 
emphasis placed on narrative in existing work on phronesis. Qualitative research 
epistemologies view knowledge as situated and contextual, and interviews allow for a 
‘thematic, topic-centred, biographical or narrative approach’ that is in line with interpretivist 
ontology (Mason, 2002). Interpretivist approaches argue that people can and do tell others 
about their lives (Brewer, 2000) in the same way that Boje (1991) and Zagzebski (2013, 
2017) argue that people share stories about virtuous people and their actions as sense-making 
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activities.  One way interpretivist research accesses these lived experiences is through semi-
structured interviews, which involve an interactional exchange of dialogue that is relatively 
informal in style, as well as fluid and flexible, allowing space for the story-telling that serves 
as both an educational tool and social resource (Mason, 2000). 
 
Boje argues that this kind of storytelling occurs predominantly in conversations, which 
involve “listeners” (Boje, 1991: 107). In this project the interviewers have assumed the role 
of “listeners” by soliciting stories about virtuous or wise decision-making from the 
interviewees. As with any qualitative study involving interviews, these listeners are also “co-
producers with the teller of the story performance”, and thus participate in the storytelling by 
enabling the telling of the story by the storyteller (Boje, 1991: 107). In this way our research 
is not only examining the stories that get told about phronesis and virtuous behaviour, but we 
are actively participating in the storytelling that we argue is a necessary part of phronetic 
education in the wider context.  
 
Combining the humanities and the social sciences in our methodology is also part of a 
growing trend towards studying medical ethics empirically (Paton, 2017, 2018). This 
growing realisation of the role social sciences play in illuminating practice and informing 
theory in medical ethics is often referred to as ‘empirical ethics’ or ‘sociological bioethics’ 
(Haimes, 2002; Paton, 2017). However, as we made clear above, few studies have 
empirically and qualitatively examined phronesis in medicine. We set out to remedy the 
situation by using methods, methodology and theory from the social sciences, alongside 
ethical theory from the humanities to examine and analyse the research questions, making 
this project part of a new wave in empirical ethics research that goes beyond the use of social 
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science methods only, and incorporates valuable social and sociological theory in its design 
and analysis as well (Paton, 2017). 
 
Methods 
For our study, we conducted semi-structured interviews with second and final year medical 
students, junior doctors (newly qualified doctors) and experienced doctors across three 
medical schools and hospital governing bodies (called ‘trusts’) in central England over a 
period of two years. Ethical approval was granted at each university and National Health 
Service trust involved [details removed for peer-review]. Participants were recruited through 
a combination of invitation to participate emails sent through the school or trust, and 
presentations given by the authors during lectures and training. Interviews were audio 
recorded and transcribed with the written consent of the participants. In this article we will 
focus on the interviews with the junior doctors, as this was the longitudinal sample of the 
research. These participants were interviewed once at the beginning of their first foundation 
year (their first year after medical school as a doctor), and again during their second 
foundation year (their second year after medical school as a doctor). In total forty-six 
interviews were conducted with junior doctors. Twenty-eight participants were interviewed 
during their foundation year one, twelve of this initial group agreed to a follow-up interview 
in their foundation year two, and six were newly recruited participants in their foundation 
year two. Transcribed data were analysed by both authors in NVivo using thematic analysis 
(Attride-Silver, 2001). Themes were refined through secondary analysis by both authors 
together, then further analysed with regards to narrative and virtue theory. A number of 
themes were identified, with storytelling being one of the most prominent and consistent 
themes across all cohorts and interviews.  
 




In interviews participants routinely approached medical ethics narratively. Participants told 
stories about moral dilemmas they and others had encountered, and would often use narrative 
to illustrate how they understood phronesis, wisdom and wise decision-making. Most often 
participants used stories to explain ethical dilemmas, and in particular articulated how 
hearing and telling stories about ethically difficult scenarios or moral exemplars was their 
preferred way to learn how to make ethical decisions and, by extension, develop phronesis. 
The terms ‘phronesis’, ‘practical wisdom’, and even ‘wisdom’ were not frequently used by 
interviewees, and many participants had never come across the term ‘phronesis’ before. 
However, the concept of phronesis, and the development of phronesis through experience 
(both their own and the ‘vicarious’ experience gained from listening to others’ stories) was 
readily acknowledged by all participants as the primary way doctors learn to make ethical 
decisions. Interviewees also articulated an understanding of wise/unwise doctors and 
wise/unwise decisions that they had witnessed or heard about.  
 
Three major themes emerged from the analysis that captured the importance that storytelling 
has to how doctors use storytelling as part of their ethical education and phronetic 
development: 
1. Learning medical ethics through storytelling 
2. Developing phronesis through storytelling and ‘story-listening’ 
3. Passing on/Teaching phronesis through ‘phronesis narrative’ (both self-learning and 
teaching to others) 
We would like to turn to each of these themes now to explain the role of storytelling to the 
development of phronesis, such that it facilitates ethical decision-making in medical practice.  
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Learning Medical Ethics through Storytelling 
Participants rarely spoke about procedure or ethical guidelines that they had learned during 
their training. Instead, when asked to discuss ethics, narrative was the preferred way that 
participants communicated important ethical concepts or lessons they had learned that they 
now used in their own practice1.  
 
“Just from casual conversations with a lot of the medical officers you can tell that these 
ethical issues are actually really memorable and they will talk about it […] and they’ll say oh 
we had this situation and it was really difficult to work [out] what’s the best to do and yeah 
you can see that that’s going to be really prominent in our practice.” (A109) 
 
Participants were particularly keen to discuss moral dilemmas they and their colleagues had 
encountered, and the lessons they had taken from them.  
 
“[…] so ethical issues that people haven’t come across before and you think, “Oh, I’ve never 
even considered that as an issue”. It’s good to hear from other people to think, “Right, well, 
how did you deal with that?” (C107) 
 
A vital element of this was the sharing and discussing of the stories between colleagues, and 
many participants highlighted how an important aspect of learning through stories was the 
collegial element of doing so with a fellow healthcare professional.  
 
                                                          
1 Interviewees are identified here using a letter to denote the hospital or medical school site (A, B, or C), the 
number 1 to denote the interviewee is in their foundation year 1, and subsequent numbers have been randomly 
assigned to distinguish between speakers. Where ‘follow-up’ is noted, this indicates the participant was 
interviewed twice, the second time during their foundation year 2.  
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“We have a chat about things […] saying, “Well, I’m not quite sure how to approach this”, 
then you may have, “Oh, well, this is how I did it in the past”, or, “This is how I’ve seen 
somebody else do it really…” … That taught me quite a lot.” (B105) 
 
 
“But I think those are the ones where I will be speaking to […] either a colleague or a nurse 
[…] talk about what they would do in this situation […] I am still quite open to taking on 
other people’s opinions in my own decision making, because I feel like there is a lot of room 
for more knowledge and things in where I am right now […]” (A101) 
 
 
Developing Phronesis through Storytelling and Listening to Stories 
While participants rarely used the term ‘phronesis’ in interviews, they often described the 
concept and its development when discussing how storytelling and listening to stories helped 
participants develop a bank of experience. This was a recurrent theme articulated by the 
participants in their initial and follow-up interviews. This experience did not necessarily have 
to be developed through personal experience, but through the hearing of stories of other 
people’s experience. Together these stories formed a quasi-collective library of experience 
for junior doctors from which they often drew to seek advice, make ethical decisions and take 
action. 
 
“…because part of wisdom does have to be listening to other people…” (A101) 
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“I don’t think anyone is born with the ability to make wise decisions.  I think it’s, a lot, based 
on experiences, and through observations of other cases; and review and reflection of other 
cases.” (A111, follow-up) 
 
“[…] I don’t think intelligence and wisdom are the same thing; you can be intelligent, smart, 
but having wisdom means taking your time, taking a step back, having a broader view of the 
problem, thinking beyond your immediate self.” (C104, follow-up) 
 
 
“Talk to your seniors about why they made that particular decision that time. […] It’s 
something that I don’t think can be taught in just a lecture, that over time you can pick up 
some of the reasoning that other people have been making.” (C107, follow-up) 
 
 
Wise and unwise decisions were frequently discussed and participants often told stories about 
wise or unwise decisions they had witnessed, as well as wise and unwise doctors they had 
worked with.  
 
“I think storytelling, whether it’s a case that happens around the table that you look at a 
patient, or something that’s been more informal in life probably forms part of your memory.  
Essentially it forms a bank of wise and unwise decisions.” (B104) 
 
“[…] I feel like my GP trainer makes a lot more decisions based on his practical wisdom 
from similar cases and things rather than necessarily doing lots of tests which sometimes feel 
fairly pointless in a hospital setting.  (A108, follow-up) 




Participants also regularly stressed that learning to be wise was a matter of experience that 
builds up over time.  
 
“I feel as though med school taught me quite well, ethics, four principles, all that kind of stuff 
– sort of more formal […] It’s more suited to a classroom […] I think the phronesis […]I 
think that pertains a lot more to being a doctor; and I think being able to make those on-the-
hoof decisions […]the practical wisdom, where you’ve had years of ethical training behind 
you, that is then linked up to your actual practical experience, and your expertise in that 
area.  I think phronesis more aptly describes what a doctor does on a day-to-day basis.” 
(Al05, follow-up) 
 
In particular, participants predominantly shared stories of how moral exemplars, who always 
had more experience, dealt with difficult ethical dilemmas, which in turn helped them to act 
wisely in the future. These stories were sometimes first- hand accounts of something the 
participants had witnessed, but were often retellings of the story after it had been shared by 
the actor themselves, or through other colleagues.  
 
 “…in my last job of F2, my medical consultant, one of the respiratory physicians, he was a 
really, really solid role model.  He’d make a decision; you could see why he’s made it, or 
even if you couldn’t see why he’s made it, it makes sense when he explains it to you, and 
yeah, those are people I really look up to, medically.” (A105, follow-up) 
 
“I think we see our seniors, often, as role models; and I think people are often very quick to 
make decisions about their senior consultant, as to whether they’re a good role model to 
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have, or whether they’re not; and people do role-model.  I think most junior doctors, from 
my experience, do role-model themselves off their consultants who they think are 
particularly good […] “That consultant’s really good at that.  I want to be like that when I 




“There was one doctor I was with, actually – this is in medical school – who really struck me 
as wise.  […]I sat in with him for one clinic, and at the end of it, he was explaining […]how 
with each patient who comes in the door, he’s trying to gauge what kind of doctor would be 
most helpful for them, and then to fill that role for them. And so, like, some people, he would 
say, are looking for more of a kind informal, sort of an equal kind of a chat; and you get 
some people looking for more of, you know, just someone who will tell you the answer, and 
say, “This is what we need to do”; or one might want you to joke around, and one might 
want to be very serious – and he’s kind of feeling for that, always, and trying to feel that.  I 
just thought that was really, really lovely.” (B108) 
 
 
Some interviewees did consider whether, next to stories about exemplars, there are some 
other ways to develop phronesis. The most obvious alternative would be to try and codify 
what a wise decision is in some kind of procedure. It is notable that, when exploring this 
possibility a number of interviewees quickly pointed out the shortcomings of having some 
kind of codified procedure to encode how to make a wise decision. Again, exemplars with 
experience were appealed to by the participants as a way to adjudicate difficult ethical 
dilemmas.  




I like guidelines, I think they’re really useful especially if you’re the junior and I think in a 
way you’ve got to stick to the guidelines but there’s difficult situations where guidelines 
don’t help you because it’s either such a specific situation that you can’t go by the guidelines 
and you’ve got to speak to somebody with experience. (A110, follow-up) 
   
Many participants explained that more generally guidelines themselves often do not help in 
making a clear decision, as the guidelines themselves need to be interpreted, and this is a 
matter of judgement.  
 
I suppose things like at what point to stop treatment for someone who’s got an infection with 
very advanced malignancy.  You can’t have a tick box – “If they’ve got this, this, or this, you 
should stop”.  (B107, follow-up) 
 
When faced with this problem, interviewees regularly said that it is a matter of experience 
how to interpret and implement a guideline. 
 
Passing on/Teaching phronesis through ‘phronesis narrative’  
One of the most interesting ways that participants used storytelling and narrative to develop 
phronesis was through the use of what we call “phronesis narrative”. There were stories that 
participants told us about how they learned to use better judgement and be more wise. Often 
these narratives were told as a form of self-confirmation or self-learning of lessons learned 
from the participant’s own experience in developing phronesis. However they also acted as 
part of the life-cycle of phronetic development, as in the act of retelling these stories 
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participants were contributing to their own phronetic development, and passing on stories for 
the development of others by imparting their experience and growing wisdom on a subject.  
 
“[…] we often have to assess capacity, do [patients] understand the risks […] which is often 
me doing it.[…], as a fairly new doctor, I think our ethical training has been much better 
than the older doctors. And, I think we are much more knowledgeable about the process of 
assessing capacity, and understand, ethically, what’s expected of us. So, that happens really 
regularly, and it’s often the Juniors who are stepping up to do that capacity assessment, 
rather than the Registrars and the Consultants.” (A109, follow-up) 
 
 
“So in one situation in [the emergency department] there was a girl that had come in saying 
that she had been assaulted and I did the history […] and there was someone else in the 
room, a partner and then when I discussed it the nurses had some concerns and said we 
think it’s a safeguarding issue because they recognise her and says she comes in repeatedly 
with lots of different injuries and things.  And I went and spoke to one the consultants about 
it and I hadn’t actually taken the girl away from the partner or asked the partner to leave the 
room to speak to her in private, I’d just spoken to her while he was in the room.  And 
immediately when the consultant came he asked the partner to leave while he had a private 
chat and then just asked her directly if it was domestic violence and that was something I 
learned quite quickly.  Like to separate, if you are thinking of domestic violence or 
something like that just separate the patient away, which is something, it sounds obvious but 
at the time I just hadn’t thought about it [...]” (C102) 
 
 




Storytelling of difficult situations and of moral exemplars took a wide variety of formats in 
the data, from informal hallway chats, to professional development meetings, to formalised 
rounds. In medicine, good or virtuous action is defined as the kind of action a good or 
virtuous doctor would take, and ‘after the fact’ accounts, like those described above, are 
common practice. Our data confirm that doctors not only share stories of events with one 
another (Montgomery Hunter, 1991), and learn and develop professionally from this 
storytelling, but that the type of story shared has a significant influence as well. In particular, 
when stories are told about ethical dilemmas in medical practice, the learning takes on a 
moral dimension and these stories become phronesis narratives that facilitate medical ethics 
education and development.   
 
The important role of storytelling in moral learning has been previously recognised in various 
fields that reflect the social science-humanities hybrid roots of this study, but have never been 
explicitly brought together to show the link between storytelling about ethical dilemmas and 
learning how to act ethically as a doctor. Philosophical work on narrative recognises that 
narrative is one crucial way of understanding human action and meaning (Schultz and 
Flashing, 2011). Understanding the ethical dimensions of human action, in particular the 
normative judgements placed on human action, is often achieved through narrative. While 
narrative as a “constitutive aspect of ethics” is often denied in favour of an objectivist view of 
ethical decisions and medical responsibility in medicine, this denial does not negate the 
importance that narrative has in understanding medical ethics (Schultz and Flasher, 2011: 
396).  
However, ignoring the important role of narrative in providing moral explanation only serves 
to “conceal the ‘lived’ dimension of meaning in ways that alienate, marginalise, and estrange 
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patients and providers from themselves and their worlds” (Schultz and Flasher, 2011: 396). 
As a result, instead of using narrative to interrogate ethical decisions and examine the ethical 
dimensions of medicine, it is often viewed as a value-neutral tool that can do little more than 
“provide a record of the facts of the illness” (Schultz and Flasher, 2011: 396). Ignoring 
narrative in ethics, and in particular in medical ethics, is an extension of the applied bioethics 
legacy, which attempts to view medical ethics as above interpretation and universally 
applicable, while disregarding the ever changing complexities of the medical realm and the 
individual context within which each ethical decision is made (Paton, 2017).   
 
Instead, as Schultz and Flasher argue, it is necessary to recognise that “appeals which guide 
the exercise of ‘right reason’ in medical and ethical decisional activity are, themselves, 
already shaped by narrative discourse” (2011: 401). Whether medical science and objectivist 
accounts of medical ethics want to acknowledge the role of narrative in medicine is 
irrelevant, as narrative is a fundamental part of the medical institution. As Kathryn 
Montgomery Hunter argues in Doctors’ Stories (1991), medical knowledge is inextricably 
rooted in narrative; without narrative, in particular patient narrative, it would be impossible to 
take patient histories and share experiences of previous cases, both of which are necessary 
features of treating patients. Medical knowledge needs storytelling as it is a “special way of 
knowing”, and medical knowledge without narrative is incomplete (Schultz and Flasher, 
2011: 399). Our data echoed these same arguments, with participants continually highlighting 
the important role that narrative had in their moral learning. Participants provided examples 
of how they experienced narrative as a fundamental part of practicing not just medicine, but 
“good” medicine that they believed was also ethically sound. Narrative was considered by 
participants to be a crucial element of it as “the way […] providers and patients understand 
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the realities of health and illness is determined by how the story is articulated” (Schultz and 
Flasher, 2011: 404).  
 
Moral Exemplars and Phronetic Development  
An important articulation of the story is the moral exemplar, however previous work has 
ignored the role of the exemplar in phronetic development in favour of more generalised 
discussion of phronesis in medicine.  In the data moral exemplars and the stories about them 
were a prominent source of phronetic development and moral learning. Participants 
consistently told stories about moral exemplars and explicitly discussed how they used moral 
exemplars as compasses for their own actions.  
Further discussion of Zagzebski’s ‘exemplarist theory’ of the nature of virtue, which gives a 
central role to exemplars, helps us to understand the importance exemplars had to 
participants. As we have previously argued, the motivating emotion that drives human action 
is admiration (Zagzebski, 2013). Like Aristotle’s virtuous man, an exemplar is a 
“paradigmatically good person” who inspires admiration and as a result those observing the 
exemplar wish to imitate them (Zagzebski, 2013: 201). By admiring the virtuous traits of 
exemplars it is possible to develop a similar character to them, thus becoming virtuous 
ourselves. Zagzebski writes: 
‘The model I am proposing starts with admiration of an exemplar, which leads to an 
imaginative ideal of oneself, which in turn produces emulation of the exemplar’s 
motives and acts. The moral learner does the virtuous act from a virtuous motive 
because the learner is emulating someone who does that act from that motive. With 
practice, the agent becomes disposed to doing acts of that kind from motives of that 
kind.’ (2017) 
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As we found in our research, Zagzebski suggests there is a link between storytelling and 
moral education through the narrative vehicle of exemplars. As she puts it “narratives are the 
primary vehicle for the moral education of the young, the primary way humans of any age 
develop and alter their moral sensibilities” (2013: 196). This holds true for those training to 
become medical doctors. Stories are also helpful in precipitating action as they “capture the 
imagination, and elicit emotions that motivate action” (Zagzebski, 2013: 196). We also found 
it easy to identify exemplars possibly because, as Zagzebski points out, the practice of 
identifying them is embedded in our current moral practice as “we learn through narratives of 
fictional and non-fictional persons that some people are admirable and worth imitating” 
(2013: 199). Storytelling is an essential part of identifying exemplars; they are essentially a 
narrated observation about the virtues and traits of an individual person, which “reveal the 
necessary features of value by uncovering the deep properties of a good person” (Zagzebski, 
2013: 200). In addition the use of exemplars is flexible, as exemplars for a given scenario can 
change given the context, and like phronesis, an individual can be “good” or “virtuous” in 
different ways, depending on the situation they are observed in (Zagzebski, 2013).  
Phronesis Narratives 
Participants used stories about exemplars, and stories about ethical dilemmas more generally, 
in a unique way to reflect on their own actions and reinforce their moral learning through the 
telling of phronesis narratives: narratives that explicitly laid out how they learned to become 
wise. Phronesis narratives are an important social phenomenon in moral learning as the social 
world is “storied” (Lawler, 2008), and phronesis reflects this as it is developed through the 
sharing of stories. Stories are in all aspects of encounters, and are part of how people make 
sense of their lives and others. Importantly, stories are a contextual source that people use 
when “sense-making” (Lawler, 2008). This is because life stories, the stories we tell each 
other about each other, are normative. They contain within them rules that “adhere to local 
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(in time and space) intelligibility norms” from within our own cultures (Lawler, 2008, p. 33; 
see also Gergen and Gergen, 1986). Participants used phronesis narratives as part of their 
sense-making process. By telling phronesis narratives participants were ‘checking’ their 
actions, while also passing on moral knowledge to others. Just as exemplars are admired for 
their virtuous traits, these life stories elicit responses based on existing norms about right and 
wrong action, through which we can judge others after hearing the stories and further our 
moral education, making these stories important “cultural and social resources” (Lawler, 
2008; Zagzebski, 2013).  
One aspect of these phronesis narratives that we argue is a crucial part of understanding the 
importance storytelling has to moral, phronetic development is that of “emplotment”. 
Emplotment examines not just the detail of the story itself, but the process of storytelling as 
well. As Lawler so carefully argues, emplotment considers “the narrative in its social context: 
stories completed […] in the circulation of relations between story, the producer of the story, 
and the audience for the story, in the context of local rules for what constitutes a meaningful 
story” (Lawler, 2008: 33). In short, emplotment examines what the story “does”, by not only 
being told, but simply existing as a story to be told or that has been told. We argue that one of 
the things that storytelling “does” is promote moral education through the storytelling of 
exemplars; their character and actions. Stories are told within the context of “local rules”, and 
as such they can carry normative value about right and wrong actions, and the people who 
carry them out, within a particular culture. This argument is further supported by the 
articulation of interviewees’ that ethics policy and guidelines were better taught (and 
understood) through narratives about difficult ethical situations, than through the inflexible 
tick-box structure they were formally taught in training.  
This is not to say that the context of the stories, the character, action and plot, are not also an 
important part of storytelling. Plot in particular helps the story “do” what it “does” by 
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showing the point of the story, which in the case of exemplars, moral education and phronesis 
is about revealing the virtuous character of an exemplar. Lawler argues, and we agree, that 
narrative must have a point, as plot is “a central feature of narrative […] it brings together 
different events and episodes into a meaningful whole” (Lawler, 2008: 35). Plot not only 
assigns meaning to stories, but is also an essential way that people engage in the learning of 
morality through storytelling as both the narrator and the audience participate in linking the 
plot together “through a shared cultural understanding that these events have a place in this 
narrative” (Lawler, 2008: 36). The story of the exemplar serves a particular function when 
told in a particular context within the social/cultural environment in which the story is shared. 
As such, part of creating and using the narrative as a resource is to listen to it and consider its 
significance in action. In this way stories can over time almost become exemplars in and of 
themselves if they carry significant narrative about how to act.  
The development of stories and narratives into entities in and of themselves is not 
unprecedented. The sharing of patient illness narratives has been viewed in a similar light, 
with Frank arguing that as these narratives are shared they develop a power of their own 
through their retelling, becoming an ever-widening “circle of shared experience” (Frank, 
1995, xii). Both Frank and Kleinman classically argue that this kind of storytelling is an 
ethical act in itself: arguing that by telling the story the narrator assumes normative 
responsibility for that story (Frank, 1995), as the dialectic between teller and listener is an 
“opportunity for moral education” (Kleinman, 1988, xiv). Similarly, phronesis narratives are 
not just the sharing of experience, but carry with them a normative impetus to pass on these 
stories of a way of growing the bank of experience, thus furthering the development of 
phronesis and the continuing of a medical moral education.    
Conclusion 
   
25 
 
Given storytelling’s importance as a social resource, which dates all the way back to 
Aristotle, it is unsurprising that “narratives always and necessarily build in attempts at 
understanding” (Lawler, 2008: 36). The telling of and listening to stories can be considered 
deliberate, normative actions, as there are “consequences of storytelling—for those who tell 
the stories and for those who study them” (Czarniawska, 2004: 37; Frank, 1995). Stories 
guide actions (Somers and Gibson, 1994), and when stories guide action, the act of 
storytelling is normative in that we are engaging in an activity that has important 
consequences within a community. As Reissman argues, “storytellers interpret the world and 
the experience in it: they sometimes create moral tales—how the world should be” 
(Riessman, 2005: 1). This is particularly true of the role that storytelling has in influencing 
decision-making. Boje, like Lawler and others, argues that stories are the “preferred sense-
making currency” of human relationships, and are used to help decision-making by helping 
listeners to avoid “repeating historically bad choices” while inviting listeners to consider the 
value of “the repetition of past successes” (Boje, 1991: 106). Storytelling is a powerful tool 
with which to promote moral education and the development of phronesis, and thus deserves 
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